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SUPERIOR COURT, MARIN COUNTY,
CALIFORNIA
LAW & MOTION, CIVIL CALENDAR
RULINGS
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PAGE 12-A |
TIME: 9:00
JUDGE: GARY W. THOMAS
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DATE:OCTOBER 6, 1995
REPORTER: E. PASSARIS |
DEPT: 1
CLERK: J. BANKSON |
CASE NO: 157680 |
TITLE OF ACTION: CHURCH SCIENTOLOGY V.
ARMSTRONG |
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
ADJUDICATION
ARE GRANTED.
AS TO THE THIRTEENTH, SIXTEENTH, SEVENTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CAUSES OF ACTION,
PLAINTIFF HAS MET ITS
BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT DEFENDANT BREACHED THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND THAT IT
IS ENTITLED TO
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OF $50,000 FOR EACH BREACH. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO RAISE A
TRIABLE ISSUE AS T0
ANY OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION, AS FOLLOWS:
INVALIDITY OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION:
DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE REGARDING HIS ATTORNEYS'
FAILURE TO REPRESENT HIS INTERESTS (SEE FACTS 43 AND 68) IS HEARSAY AND/OR NOT
BASED ON PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE. THE OPINION OF DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE PROVISION
(SEE, E.G.,
FACTS 52-54, 57-60) IS IRRELEVANT AND HEARSAY. THE FACT THAT TWO OTHER CLIENTS
SIGNED A SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT CONTAINING THE SAME LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AMOUNT (SEE FACTS 55-56 AND 63-64)
DOES NOT RAISE
AN INFERENCE THAT THE PROVISION WAS UNREASONABLE. DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE IS
INSUFFICIENT
TO RAISE A
REASONABLE INFERENCE OF UNEQUAL BARGAINING POWER (NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE SHOWN
THAT PLAINTIFF, AS
OPPOSED TO FLYNN, POSITIONED DEFENDANT AS A "DEAL BREAKER"; FLYNN'S
STATEMENTS HEARSAY; NO PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE SHOWN OF PLAINTIFF'S WEALTH; WEALTH ALONE DOES NOT RAISE INFERENCE OF
UNEQUAL BARGAINING
POWER SINCE NO SHOWING DEFENDANT DESPERATE FOR MONEY AND HAD TO ACCEPT ON
PLAINTIFF'S
TERMS).
DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE DOES NOT RAISE AN INFERENCE THAT PLAINTIFF'S CALCULATION
IS "UNFATHOMABLE"
(FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION SEEKS $50,000 FOR EACH OF 18 LETTERS; NINETEENTH CAUSE
OF ACTION IS
BASED ONLY ON DECLARATIONS, NOT ON OTHER CONTACTS BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND
ATTORNEY/OTHER
CLIENTS).
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH HOW HE KNOWS PLAINTIFF HAD NOT BEEN INJURED BY HIS
STATEMENTS AT THE
TIME OF SETTLEMENT.
DURESS: FLYNN'S STATEMENTS TO DEFENDANT
ARE HEARSAY. (SEE, E.G., D'S FACTS 1C AND 1D.)
FURTHER DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT PLAINTIFF WAS AWARE OF FLYNN'S PURPORTED
DURESS OF DEFENDANT.
(SEE LEEPER V. BELTRAMI (1959) 53 CAL.2D 195, 206.) CONTRARY TO
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT ABOUT DURESS,
"CAREFUL WEIGHING OF OPTIONS" IS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH AN ABSENCE
"OF THE FREE EXERCISE OF
HIS WILL POWER" OR HIS HAVING "NO REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE TO
SUCCUMBING."
(SEE PHILIPPINE EXPERT &
FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORP. V. CHUIDIAN (1990) 218 CAL.APP.3D 1058,
1078; IN RE MARRIAGE OF BALTINS
(1989) 212 CAL.APP.3D 66, 84.)
(CONTINUED TO PAGE 12-A-1.)
8680
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SUPERIOR COURT, MARIN COUNTY,
CALIFORNIA
LAW & MOTION, CIVIL CALENDAR
RULINGS
|
PAGE 12-A-1 |
TIME: 9:00
JUDGE: GARY W. THOMAS
|
DATE:OCTOBER 6, 1995
REPORTER: E. PASSARIS |
DEPT: 1
CLERK: J. BANKSON |
CASE NO: 157680 |
TITLE OF ACTION: CHURCH SCIENTOLOGY V.
ARMSTRONG |
FRAUD:
FLYNN'S STATEMENTS TO DEFENDANT (SEE FACT 78) ARE HEARSAY. THE COURT FINDS THAT
THE
PORTIONS OF THE AGREEMENT CITED BY DEFENDANT (SEE FACTS 79 AND 80) DO NOT ESTABLISH
A MUTUAL
CONFIDENTIALITY REQUIREMENT. PARAGRAPH 7(I) ONLY PROHIBITS THE PARTIES FROM
DISCLOSING
INFORMATION
IN LITIGATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES; PARAGRAPH 18 (D) ONLY PROHIBITS DISCLOSURE
OF THE TERMS OF THE
SETTLEMENT; DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT PLAINTIFF DID EITHER OF THOSE THINGS.
FURTHER,
"[S]OMETHING MORE THAN NONPERFORMANCE IS REQUIRED TO PROVE THE DEFENDANT'S
INTENTION NOT TO PERFORM
HIS PROMISE." (TENZER V. SUPERSCOPE, INC. (1985) 39 CAL.3D
18, 30-31.)
NO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, BREACH OF EXPRESS
AND IMPLIED COVENANT: DEFENDANT RELIES ON THE
PURPORTED MUTUALITY REQUIREMENT, WHICH HE HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE: THIS ARGUMENT WAS REJECTED BY THE COURT IN CONNECTION
WITH PLAINTIFF'S
PREVIOUS MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION. (SEE 2/22/95 ORDER AT ¶6.)
FIRST AMENDMENT: FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS MAY BE WAIVED BY CONTRACT. (SEE
ITT TELECOM PRODUCTS
CORP. V. DOOLEY (1989) 214 CAL.APP.3D 307, 319.)
AS TO THE TWENTIETH CAUSE OF ACTION, THE COURT WILL NOT ORDER DEFENDANT TO
REMOVE INFORMATION FROM
FACTNET. PLAINTIFF'S OWN EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT DEFENDANT IS NO LONGER A DIRECTOR
OR OFFICER OF
FACTNET (SEE P'S EX. 1CCCC AT 955:1-4), AND PLAINTIFF SETS FORTH NO FACTS OR
EVIDENCE
SHOWING THAT
DEFENDANT HAS THE PRESENT ABILITY TO REMOVE INFORMATION FROM FACTNET. IN ADDITION,
PLAINTIFF HAS
NOT ESTABLISHED THAT ALL OF THE MATERIALS IN FACTNET'S POSSESSION WERE SUPPLIED
BY DEFENDANT. IN
ALL OTHER RESPECTS, THE MOTION AS TO THE TWENTIETH CAUSE OF ACTION IS GRANTED.
THE PLAINTIFF HAS ASKED THAT THE EXHIBITS WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY ORDERED SEALED
BE STRICKEN AS THEY
ARE TRADE SECRETS, IRRELEVANT TO THIS MOTION. THIS REQUEST IS GRANTED. THEY ARE
NOT RELEVANT.
FURTHER, THEY WERE FILED BY MR. ARMSTRONG IN PRO PER WHEN HE IS, IN FACT,
REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL.
[HW] Tentative ruling becomes final.
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